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Hellerstein: Fourth Amendment Cases

SECTION 1983 FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES
FROM THE CURRENT TERM
William E. HellersteinI
Erwin is always a hard act to follow, but I know he is an
avid baseball fan and that he had to have been up late last night
watching the game. I, for one, am glad that the World Series has
moved out of town and on to Arizona. Not because I am a Yankee
fan or anything, I am not, but because I need some sleep. What
I'm saying is that I look at this morning's schedule and I see that
Erwin is doing his thing here before you at eight o'clock, as only
he can, and now I have to try to do mine at nine in his wake.
Well, Judge Pratt, the Court's past Term was quite a Fourth
Amendment Term. And, unlike in many previous Terms, the
Fourth Amendment did not shrink very much at all. The Court
decided seven Fourth Amendment cases and, in some respects,
some of the work the Court did is especially important in light of
the events of September 11 th.
The first case that falls into this category is Kyllo v. United
States,2 the thermal imaging case. I choose to place this decision
under the rubric "Katz Lives," and I am referring, of course, to the
landmark case of Katz v. United States,3 decided in 1967. Katz,
you will recall, altered significantly the manner in which the Court
determined whether a person had a privacy interest protected by
the Fourth Amendment. Justice Potter Stewart, writing for the
Court, held that the existence of such an interest was no longer
contingent on property and trespass concepts. 4 Instead, he told us5
that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not places."
Although Stewart's opinion did not go very far in telling us how
that concept should be applied in future cases, Justice John
1Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., Brooklyn College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; Professor Hellerstein teaches Constitutional Law, Civil
Rights Law, and Criminal Procedure. He is an expert in criminal law and
constitutional litigation, and has argued numerous appeals before the U.S.
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the New York Court of Appeals.
2 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
3389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4 Id. at 352-53.
5
Id. at 351.
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Marshall Harlan's concurring opinion emphasized that a
protectible interest had both a subjective and objective basis: a
person does not have a privacy interest as to anything he
knowingly exposes to be public and even if does not expose
something to the public, he will have a privacy interest only insofar6
as it is the type of interest that society is willing to recognize.
When Katz was decided, Fourth Amendment aficionados believed
it was a great day because the Court had departed from the wooden
restrictiveness of property and trespass concepts in favor of a more
realistic and indeed broader measure of a person's privacy
interests. However, as the years have passed, what interests
"society" determines are entitled to privacy protection under the
Fourth Amendment became essentially what interests five Justices
believe society would recognize, even though many of us, perhaps
even the majority of us, would differ. For many, the promise of
Katz was short-lived insofar as the Court, more often than not,
determined that a particular interest was not one which "society"
would validate. For example, did we have a privacy right in our
garbage when we place it outside our abode? The Supreme Court
said society does not recognize such an interest. 7 When the police
fly over and photograph a person's fenced-in property to detect
marijuana growth, does the property owner have a protectible
privacy interest? No, said the Court, because air traffic is
commonplace. 8 And even where it is not commonplace because
FAA regulations prohibit airplane flights at low altitudes, there is

6

Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).

7 California

v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (holding that a person
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when leaving garbage out on
the curb because "society" does not have an expectation of privacy in trash left
on the curb for collection, due to the fact that it is accessible to anyone. As
such, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
warrantless search and seizure of an individual's garbage when left on a curb).
8 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (holding that a
warrantless, naked-eye observation by a police officer who obtained an airplane
to view an individual's backyard, because of an anonymous telephone tip
reporting the individual was growing marijuana, did not violate the individual's
Fourth Amendment right, reasoning that this expectation of privacy is not what
"society is prepared to honor").

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss4/5

2

Hellerstein: Fourth Amendment Cases

2002

FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES

693

no privacy interest cognizable against police helicopter flights that
come within FAA regulations.9
In view of the restrictive manner in which the Court had
generally applied the Katz test, Kyllo is a significant step in the
other direction. In Kyllo, government agents suspected that Kyllo
was growing marijuana in his home. 10 So they used a thermal
imaging device that detects heat emanating from the walls of a
building and then they obtained a warrant based on the fact that the
thermal imaging device produced a positive result. 1 In a five to
four decision, the Court held that where the government uses a
device that is not in general public use to explore details of the
home that would previously have been unknowable without a
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.' 2 Since Katz, the Court has
consistently stated that if one does not have an expectation of
privacy in some thing or place that society is willing to recognize,3
there is no search, end of Fourth Amendment discussion.'
Therefore, for police conduct to constitute a search, there has to be
an expectation of
privacy in what the police have intruded on, and
4
was.'
there
here
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia acknowledged
that the Court's post- Katz line of jurisprudence had become quite
circular.' 5 In fact, that might be an understatement, given much
scholarly criticism of the Court's rulings. But in Kyllo, Justice
Scalia held that when a the privacy of a person's home is at issue,
there is a ready criterion for crediting that privacy interest because
we have roots deep in the common law about the sanctity of the
9 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448-451 (1989) (holding that a police officer
who obtained a warrant by observing an individual's property by helicopter after
the officer could not view the property from the ground, was not in violation of
tie Fourth Amendment because the defendant could not reasonably have
believed that his greenhouse could not have been seen by a helicopter flying
overhead, and concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not require the police

to obtain a warrant for naked eye observations, even in an aircraft).
:o Kyollo, 533 U.S. at 29.
"Id. at 30.
1Id. at 40.
'3 See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)
(holding that a
dog sniff is not a "search"); see also supra, notes 7-9.
Kyollo, 533 U.S. at 34.
5

1d.
I
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home and the expectation of privacy that exists within it, which is
acknowledged as reasonable both historically and by the Court's
decisions.' Thus, utilization of a device that obtains information
about a person's behavior inside a home that could not have been
obtained17 without a physical intrusion of the home constitutes a
search.
The Kyllo decision is very significant because Justice
Scalia suggests that the Court's decision is not a ticket for this case
alone. He stated that the rule the Court is adopting must take
account of more sophisticated surveillance systems than are
is not to be
already in use or development' 8 so that a homeowner
9
left to the mercy of expanding technology.'
Of considerable interest is that the dissent is written by
Justice Stevens, whom you would not expect to be hanging out
with Chief Justice Rehnquist, O'Connor and Kennedy on an issue
such as this. Justice Stevens felt upset, however, about a number
of things: first, he asked, what happened to traditional restraint in
decision making? 20 He pointed out that Justice Scalia's opinion is
not limited to thermal imaging devices. 2 1 Justice Scalia, says
Stevens, is laying a blueprint for the future that extends to all types
of developing technology that could expose things within a
home. 22 Well, think about some of the things that have come to
our attention since 9/11. The thermal imager may be crude in
comparison to devices such as very sophisticated ones that can
detect explosives and certain gases from within premises. There
are also in use powerful directional microphones that can detect
sounds within the home and satellite detection devices that can
detect certain types of light rays. All of these technologies and
more are out there. Is the fact that some are not yet in general
Justice
public use a criterion present in the Court's opinion?
Stevens suggests that "public use" is not a meaningful criterion
since, according to him, a person can go to Home Depot or a
16

id.

1 d. at 40.

Id. at 35-36; see also id. at 36 n.3 (describing projects already underway by
law enforcement to see through walls and other barriers).
'9 Id. at 35.
18

20
Kyollo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2
1

22

id.
id.
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similar store and acquire a thermal imager -- and that would be true
for many other devices. 23 Second, in Stevens' view, the thermal
imager does not intrude seriously on a person's privacy. 24 All that
it exposes are heat rays. Here, Stevens makes light of Justice
Scalia's observation that a thermal imager would allow the police
to tell whether the lady of the house is taking a bath or is in her
sauna. 2 5 Stevens says, "not so," because images from inside the
26
house are not transmitted; all that is transmitted is heat intensity.
Consider this in connection with Kyllo. In United States v.
Place,27 decided a few years ago, the Court held that when the
police submit your luggage to a dog sniff, it is not a search. 28 If,
after Kyllo, the police can no longer aim a thermal imager at your
home, can they bring their trained pooch to the door for a sniff and
obtain a warrant based on the dog's positive reaction at your
doorstep? It is clear that Kyllo is extremely important with respect
to governmental use of technology in general and that its holding
extends beyond thermal imaging devices.
The Court's decision in City of Indianapolisv. Edmond29 is
also of considerable significance both in its own right and in
connection with the events of 9/11.
Edmond should also be
considered in tandem with the equally significant decision in
Ferguson v. City of Charleston.30 In Edmond, the issue was the
constitutionality of a police fixed checkpoint at which vehicles
would be stopped to determine the presence of drugs. 3 1 In
Ferguson, the issue was whether pregnant women in city hospitals
whose tests turned up positive for drug use could then be subjected
to arrest and threatened with criminal prosecution unless they
entered a specified drug program. 32 Both governmental programs
would stand or fall depending on how the Supreme Court would
24

Id. at 47 n.5. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 50-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

25

Kyollo, 533 U.S. at 50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

23

26 id.

27 462 U.S. at 696.
29

Id. at 697-98.
531 U.S. 32 (2000).

30

532 U.S. 67 (2001).

31
'2

Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34.

28

Ferguson,532 U.S. at 69-70.
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assess each
case under the newly minted
"special needs"
33
doctrine.
Let me go back a little just to refresh your recollection
about the evolution of the "special needs" doctrine. Recall that
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine required that the police had
to have a warrant and probable cause. 34 Then you learned that
there were exceptions to the warrant requirement such as the
automobile exception pursuant to which the police had to have
probable cause but a vehicle's mobility excused the need for a
warrant. 35 Then, in the Warren Court era, a major adjustment was
36
made to the probable cause requirement when in Terry v. Ohio,
the Court gave us the stop and frisk doctrine, which deleted the
probable cause requirement primarily with regard to police-citizen
street encounters. 3 Under stop and frisk, the police could seize
somebody on reasonable suspicion and search him or her as long
as the seizure was not an arrest and the search was not a full search
but a patdown for weapons to protect an officer who had a
reasonable basis to conclude that the person stopped was armed.38
39
Next, along came a case from New Jersey, New Jersey v. TL.O.
in which a high school principal searched the pocketbook of a
student on suspicion that she had cigarettes and then went deeper
and found drugs.4 ° The Court upheld the search on the ground that
the principal was not a law enforcement officer, and what the
principal did was a reasonable search in light of the fact that a
school official serves not a law enforcement function but is in loco
Id. at 76; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) ("An arrest without a
warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of
33
34

probable cause. .. ").

See, e.g. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147, 149 (1925) ("The
Fourth Amendment does not denounce all searches or seizure, but only such as
are unreasonable.... On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and
seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause.. .that an automobile or
other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the
search and seizure are valid."); see also Brinegar v. United States 338 U.S. 160,
35

164-65 (1949).
36
37

392 U.S. 1 (1968).

1Id.

at 10.

38 Id.

39 469

U.S. 325 (1985).

40 Id. at 327-28.
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parentis to the student.41 But it was Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion that, for the first time, utilized the term "special
need" as another category in which traditional Fourth Amendment
doctrines could recede.42
For Justice Blackmun, the special need existed because
what was involved was a school and a student.43 This special need
concept soon was embraced by the full Court. In two cases
decided in 1989, Treasury Employees v. Von Raab" and Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives Association,45 the concept found its first
full articulation by the Court. Both were urine testing cases. In
Skinner, government regulations required urine testing for railway
employees involved in accidents and in Treasury Employees, urine
testing was required for U.S. Customs Service employees who
sought promotions to certain positions in the Customs Service. 46
In these cases, the Court could have gone one of two ways. It
could have held, as the Government argued, that urine testing did
not constitute a search, or that it was a search that required
adherence to established Fourth Amendment requirements such as
probable cause or, at least, reasonable suspicion. The Court
rejected the Government's argument that urine testing was not a
search.47 But it rejected the employees' arguments that probable
cause or reasonable suspicion was required. 8 Instead, the Court
4'Id. at

340; see also id. at 341 ("The accommodation of the privacy interests
of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for
freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the
requirement that searches be based on probable cause .... ).
42 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I believe that we have used such a
balancing test, rather than strictly applying the Fourth Amendment's Warrant
and Probable-Cause Clause, only when we were confronted with a 'special law
enforcement need for greater flexibility."') (citations omitted).
43 Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The elementary and secondary
school setting presents a special need for flexibility justifying a departure from
the balance struck by the Framers.").

"489 U.S. 656 (1989).
4'489

U.S. 602 (1989).
4Id.
at 606; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 662-63.
47
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.

Id. at 634 ("We conclude that the compelling Government interest served by
the FRA's regulations would be significantly hindered if railroads were required
to point to specific facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion of impairment
before testing a given employee"); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.
49
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held that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement was
satisfied in both cases by the "special needs" of the Government. 9
With respect to post-railway accident testing, there was the special
need to determine the cause of the accident and with respect to the
Customs Service there was the special need to ensure that frontline customs officers who carry weapons and search for drugs, are
not themselves involved in the use or sale of drugs. 50 Then came
the important case of Vernonia School Districtv. Acton, 5' in which
drug testing of high school athletes was fit by the Court into the
special needs doctrine because its purpose was to detect drug use,
not for law enforcement purposes, but because high school athletes
were role models and they were leading the charge in drug use,
although the trial record in the case leaves some doubt as to
whether this was the case.52 As you can see, the Government was
on a roll, so to speak, with regard to the special needs doctrine that
was evolving.
In addition to the special needs cases, the City of
Indianapolis relied heavily on two other cases in which searches
and seizures on less than probable cause or reasonable suspicion
were upheld because the governmental conduct involved did not
relate directly to criminal law enforcement.5 3 In United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,54 decided by the Court in 1976, the Court
sustained fixed immigration checkpoints located approximately a
hundred miles from the Mexican border for which no suspicion
about a vehicle's occupants was required. 55 The other case, one
-that was even closer to the situation in Edmond, was the decision
49

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21 ("The FRA has prescribed toxicological

tests.. .to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad operations that result from
impairment of employees by alcohol or drugs."); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679
(holding that "testing of employees who apply for promotion to positions
directly involving the interdiction of illegal drugg, or to positions that require the
incumbent to carry a firearm, is reasonable").
5o Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679.

" 515 U.S. 646 (1995).

Id. at 665 (holding that due to the decreased expectation of privacy of
students, the "relative unobtrusiveness of the search," and the severity of the
need satisfied by the search, the policy was constitutional).
53 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34.
54 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
51 Id. at 545.
52
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upholding a sobriety checkpoint.5 6 In Michigan Department of
State Police v. Sitz, 7 the Court in 1990 held that there was there
was nothing unreasonable about a sobriety checkpoint because its
purpose was highway safety. 58 So, here comes the City of
Indianapolis. It argues that we have Martinez-Fuerte, we have
Sitz, and here we are interested in interdicting drugs, which is also
a serious problem. 59 Hence, the Indianapolis police set up a
roadblock checkpoint, their trained dog comes by and sniffs the
car, which, as you recall, is not a search, and Indianapolis believes
that it is on safe constitutional ground. 6° But the Court by a five to
four vote said, sorry, you are wrong, this checkpoint is a violation
of the Fourth Amendment because highway safety is not its
purpose, 1drug interdiction is, and that is a law enforcement
6
purpose.
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that
drug interdiction is a legitimate social interest, but it is an interest
that rendered the roadblock a criminal law enforcement enterprise
62
for which Fourth Amendment requirements are requisite.
Although Justice O'Connor insisted that she was not applying a
"primary purpose" test, I am not sure that is clear from a reading of
the entire opinion. In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist accuses the
majority of saying precisely that. 63 Regardless which view is
accurate, it is certainly very important that the purpose of a
particular police operation be ascertained. In Edmond, there was
no escaping the fact that the checkpoint's purpose was not highway
safety." The city did not seriously argue that as with drunk
5

6Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

57 Id.

18 ld. at 447.
59Edmond, 531

6 id.
6

U.S. at 40-41.

Id. at 48 ("Because the primary purpose of the Indianapolis checkpoint

program is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime
control, the checkpoints violate the Fourth Amendment").
62 Id. at 41 ("We have never approved a checkpoint program whose primary
purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our
checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule

that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized
suspicion").

Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
4 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40-41.

63
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driving, cars were being driven by lots of people who were under
the influence of narcotics. Thus, Sitz was distinguishable because
it involved drunk drivers and Martinez-Fuertewas distinguishable
because the checkpoint
there was for the purpose of enforcing our
65
laws.
immigration
Applicable to post-9/11 circumstances is the Court's
reminder in Edmond that fixed checkpoints for other purposes such
as to interdict terrorist activity or to catch a dangerous criminal are
quite different from a checkpoint for drug interdiction.6 6 And the
Court's decision predated 9/11. Thus, Edmond will not affect
searches at airports and public buildings or even roadways where
public safety concerns are acute.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Edmond is quite
interesting. In short, he says, wait a minute, this to me seems to be
a simple arithmetic operation; one plus one equals two. 6 7 Why?
Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz allow checkpoints that have a valid
purpose and are limited in scope. 68 United States v. Place69 holds
that sniffs by dogs are not searches. 70 Here we have a valid
purpose plus a dog sniff -- conduct that does not amount to a
search. If one plus one equals two, Rehnquist asks, how can the
checkpoint be unconstitutional? 7 1 Another interesting note is that
Justice Thomas dissents on the ground that he cannot distinguish
Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte and therefore he is unable to join Justice
O'Connor's opinion that distinguishes them. 72 But he states that
he would be open to overruling both Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte.7
In this regard, Justice Thomas again displays what is becoming his
judicial signature, so to speak. Time and time again, more than
any Justice that I can recall, he has expressed the greatest

65

Id. at 43.

66 Id. at 44.

Id. at 49-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 49-51 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
69 462 U.S. at 696.
70 Id. at 697-98.
7 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 53 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
73 Id. ("I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have
considered 'reasonable' a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not
suspected of wrongdoing.").
67
68
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willingness to overrule decisions that he does not like irrespective
of whether or not the decision antedated his arrival on the Court.
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the government again
came up short in trying to fit its program into the special needs
doctrine. 74 Here, state hospital obstetric patients who were
arrested after testing positive for cocaine in urine tests conducted
by the hospital pursuant to a policy developed in conjunction with
the police sued. 75 The plaintiffs were women who went to the
hospital for prenatal care and for child delivery.76 If a woman in
the first 27 weeks of pregnancy tested positive she would be
charged with possession and if she tested positive immediately
before or right upon delivery she would be charged with child
abuse.7 7 The purpose of the program was to employ the criminal
process as leverage to get the mother to enter a drug program.78
Few can quarrel with the proposition that drug use by pregnant
women and its terrible consequences to children is a serious
problem. And, so it seemed that coping with it is a legitimate
special need. However, as in Edmond, the Court rejected the
argument.79 It held that the urine tests were "searches" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment and the tests, together with the
reporting of the positive test results to the police, were
unreasonable searches absent the patient's consent. 8° The 800pound gorilla in the room, again, was law enforcement. Unlike
prior special needs cases, said the majority, this one was not
81
divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement.
The central and indispensable feature of the policy from its
inception was the use of law enforcement to coerce the patients
into substance abuse treatment. 82 Like Edmond, therefore, the
purpose of the searches of the patients was indistinguishable from
the general interest in crime control. The majority pointed out that
74

Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 76.
Id. at 70-71.

71

76 id.

Id. at 72-73.
72.
79Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-84.
77

78

1 d. at

80 Id. at 76-77.

8'Id. at 79-80.
82 Id. at 80.
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throughout the development and application of the testing policy,
prosecutors and police were extensively involved in its
administration. 83 And, while the ultimate goal may have been to
help women into substance abuse treatment, the immediate
objective of the searches was to generate evidence for law
enforcement purposes, use of the process itself made it a law
enforcement primary purpose. In other words, the ends may be
legitimate but the means are not. 84 The Court pointed out that law
enforcement involvement always serves some broader social
purpose or objective, but that would mean that any nonconsensual
suspicionless search could be immunized under the special needs
doctrine by defining a search solely in terms of its ultimate, rather
than immediate, purpose. 85 Such a result,
said the Court, is
86
unacceptable under the Fourth Amendment.
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that a Fourth Amendment
search did not take place, because the women patients are already
tested in connection with their general medical needs. 87 All that
was done here was that the tests were turned over to the police
department. 88 But his argument did not carry the day.
Thus, in these two cases, decided back to back in one Term,
the special needs doctrine came up short. In light of the previous
direction of the doctrine, there is considerable significance for the
future in the fact that the government lost both times. Until these
two cases, in only one case, 89 had the government lost a special
needs case, and that involved a Georgia statute requiring that
persons running for political office submit to urine testing, almost
a laughable requirement, at least in my view, and the Court's as
well, judging by the lopsidedness of the vote in the case.9°

83Id. at 83 n.20.
84 Ferguson, 532

U.S. at 85-86.
Id. at 84.
16 Id. at 85.
87 Id. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
85

88 Id.

89 Chandler

v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
90 Id. (Ginsberg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with Stevens, O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Breyer, JJ, all joining. Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissented).
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The next case I want to discuss has come to be known
colloquially as "The Soccer Mom Case," but its real name is
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.91 When I taught this case in my
Criminal Procedure class, I referred to it as the soccer mom case.
Yesterday, while I was having lunch in our cafeteria, one of my
students came up to me and said, "the soccer mom was arrested for
terrorism, did you hear? She was a member of the SLA.
(Symbionese Liberation Army)."
I said, "You mean Ms.
Atwater?" She said "No, Ms. Olson." I told my student that Sara
Jane Olson is the SLA fugitive, who spent the last 25 years raising
a family under an alias, who was finally found in Minnesota. And
I guess that when I said "soccer mom" in class, my student thought
there was only one soccer mom. The irony is that Ms. Atwater
was not even taking her children to play soccer; they were too
young. But what she did not do was lace them up and use a seat
belt.92 However, the officer who stopped her did not just give her
a ticket; he arrested her.93 Texas law treats Ms. Atwater's offense
as a misdemeanor, but it is punishable by a fine only. 94 The law
allows for arrest, but also authorizes the issuance of citations
instead.95 After Ms. Atwater was arrested, she was handcuffed,
taken to the stationhouse, required to remove her shoes and empty
her pockets, photographed and placed in a cell until she was
arraigned. 96 Had it not been for neighbors nearby who came and
took custody of Ms. Atwater's children, it is not clear what the
officer would have done with them.97 Obviously there was
something going on between this officer and Ms. Atwater from a
previous encounter; Lago Vista is a small town.
One of my former colleagues is a justice of the New York
State Supreme Court whose son just finished clerking for Justice
9' 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
92 Id. at

323-24.

9' Id. at 324.
94 Id.
95

Id. at 322.

96 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324.

97 Id. at 368 (O'Connor, I., dissenting) ("Atwater's young children were

terrified and hysterical ....Atwater asked if she could at least take her children to
a friend's house down the street before going to the police station. But
Turek... refused and said he would take the children into custody as well.")
(citing the trial record).
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Souter. Her son called me and asked a favor. I said "Kenneth, I
will grant you anything you want if you tell me you had nothing to
do with Justice Souter's opinion in Atwater." Why did I say that? I
personally love Justice Souter. I think he is brilliant. I think he is
wonderful. But I do not know what happened to him in this case.
Here is why I say that.
Writing for a five to four majority, Justice Souter held that
the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a
minor criminal offense such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation,
punishable only by a fine. 98 He reasoned as follows. The common
law is less than clear. On one side, eminent authorities support
Atwater's claim that the common law confined warrantless
misdemeanor arrests to actual breaches of the peace. 99 Other
authorities differed, and prior to the American Revolution,
Parliament extended warrantless arrest authority beyond breaches
of the peace. 00 After the revolution, many states extended arrest
authority to a host of nonviolent misdemeanors.10 ' Also, said
Justice Souter, there is no evidence that the Framers were
particularly concerned with the arrest powers of the police for nonbreach of the peace offenses. 02 Furthermore, he pointed out, there
was no support in the Court's decisions for a limitation on arrests
to breach of the peace instances, and all 50 states and the District
of Columbia permit warrantless misdemeanor arrests by some
10 3
police officers without requiring breaches of the peace.
Therefore, Justice Souter concluded that a balancing of interests
was not required and that the Fourth Amendment is not well served
by a sensitive, case-by-case inquiry. °4 The police need a brightline rule because distinctions between jailable and non-jailable
offenses are not immediately known to the police.' 0 5 To bolster his
conclusion, Justice Souter 'went empirical' and concluded that
there existed no real problem in this regard between the police and
353.
99 Id. at 327-30.
98

Id. at

'0oId. at 328.

101Atwater, 532
102Id. at 340.

U.S. at 328.

103 Id. at

344; see also id. at 355-60 (Justice Souter included as an Appendix to
the Opinion of the Court the fifty-one laws in question).
'04 Id. at 347-50.
105 Id.
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the citizenry, and he drew sustenance from the inability of
Atwater's attorney to provide more than a single example of highly
questionable police conduct, and that the ACLU's amicus brief
could point to only a handful of questionable incidents.1°6 What
does he hold? The Fourth Amendment does not forbid a
warrantless arrest7 for a minor criminal offense for which there can
10
be no jail time.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor says bright line rules are
okay, but not here. 0 8 The calibrating approach taken by the Court
in its landmark stop and frisk ruling in Terry v. Ohio is more apt
here she said, what the Terry rule "lacks in precision it makes up
for in fidelity 1to the Fourth Amendment's command of
"reasonableness."' 9 A per se rule that gives police unbounded
discretion to arrest, she argued, "carries grave potential for abuse"
given the extensive powers which the police have to arrest on
probable cause, regardless if the arrest is pretextual, 10
and to search
incident to the arrest and conduct inventory searches.'
How bad was Souter's opinion? Well, compare it with
Payton v. New York,'11 a case that I argued more than 20 years ago,
which held that absent exigent circumstances, the Fourth
Amendment required that to arrest a person in his or her home the
police must have an arrest warrant." 2 The major problem that I
faced in Payton was convincing the Court that the common law
required a warrant for arrests in the home. The conundrum that I
faced was that in United States v. Watson," 3 the Court had
previously held that arrests in public did not require warrants. 114 In
scoping out the Court for Payton, we concluded that Justice
Powell's vote could well be determinative. Yet, in his concurring
opinion in Watson, Justice Powell stated that although logic led to
the conclusion that a warrant is required, there are times when

'06 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353; see also id. at 353 nn.23-24.
"07 Id. at 353.
'08 Id. at 361-63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 366 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 1.
"oId. at 364-66 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
".445 U.S. 573 (1980).
112 Id. at 603.
"3 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
114 Id. at 424.
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"logic must defer to history."" 15 The common law history that led
to Powell's vote against a warrant requirement, as described by the
leading English common law commentators, was that an arrest
warrant for a public arrest was not required.' 1 6 I concluded that to
get Justice Powell's vote in Payton, I had to show that the common
law history as to home arrests was different than it was with
respect to arrests in public. But the great English common law
commentators, like William Blackstone and Sir Matthew Hale, the
Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig of the English common law, were
against me.117 However, I did find some lesser commentators,
18
such as Lord Coke and Dalton, who said warrants were required.'
Consequently, I argued to the Court that at best, the common law
was a wash on the subject of arrests in the home. 1 9 The Court so
held and proceeded to focus on the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment in regard to a person's privacy in his or her
home.

20

What I do not understand about Justice Souter's opinion in
Atwater, is that Ms. Atwater's common law argument was much
stronger than it was for me in Payton. She had Hale, she had
12 1
Blackstone, and a bunch of the other "kenockers" as well.
Nonetheless, Justice Souter says that although Atwater has serious
support in the common law, it is not enough. 122 Since Atwater's
115Id. at

429 (Powell, J., concurring).
116 Id.; see also id. at 418 (saying "the ancient common-law rule [was] that a
peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or
felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his
presence if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.").
117 Id. at 429. Blackstone and Hale helped to establish the premise
that
magistrates could issue arrest warrants based upon information supplied by other
people as opposed to first hand information. They also both suggested that it
was valid to enter without a warrant to make a felony arrest. Id.
11' Payton, 445 U.S. at 594. Lord Coke, an English jurist, questioned whether
a Justice of the Peace could authorize an arrest by warrant if he received his
information second hand rather than through personal knowledge. He believed
that it was necessary to have a warrant to enter the premises to make an arrest.
Id.
"9
20

Id. at 598.
Id. at 603.

U.S. at 327-30.
Id. at 338-40 ("We simply cannot conclude that the Fourth Amendment, as
originally understood, forbade peace officers to arrest without a warrant for
misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of the peace.").
121 Atwater, 532
1
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case as to the common law was even stronger than it was in
Payton, why not give her the benefit of the doubt here?
Consequently, I cannot give Justice Souter very high marks for the
manner in which he deals with the historical materials on the
subject.
The second weakness in Souter's opinion is the
conclusion that he draws from Atwater's and the ACLU's inability
to deliver a parade of horribles at to what police officers have done
with their misdemeanor arrest powers-a sort of empirical "no
harm, no foul" rule. 123 But, just as the great Sherlock Holmes
could draw a positive inference from the fact that "the dog didn 't
bark," 124 could the inference not be drawn that the reason so few
examples of police misconduct in this context were discoverable is
that the type of conduct engaged in by the officer who arrested Ms.
Atwater is so aberrant that its infrequency attests to its very
unreasonableness. Indeed, Justice Souter himself condemned the
officer's conduct as outrageous and uncalled for, and stated that it
demeaned the interest of the City of Lago Vista. 125 Could he not
have taken the next step and concluded that it was so outrageous
that it explains why numerous instances do not abound and that the
infrequency pro tanto evinces why such conduct, when engaged in,
is unreasonable?
Let me now turn to the Court's other Fourth Amendment
rulings, which, though not nearly as important as the ones already
described, are not insignificant. In Illinois v. McArthur,126 the
Court held that the police can prevent a homeowner from going
back into his home when they have probable cause to believe there
are drugs in it, or if they allow him to enter, to accompany him
'2

Id. at 353.

124

See 1 SIR ARTHUR C. DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK

HOLMEs 335, 347 (Doubleday & Co., N.Y. n.d.) (1922).
follows:

The passage is as

"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"Thatwas the curious incident," remarked Sherlock Holmes.
12' Atwater, 532 U.S. at 346-47 ("Atwater's claim to live free of pointless
indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can raise against
it specific to her case.")
16 531 U.S. 326 (2001).
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while they are getting a warrant. 12 7 Mr. McArthur had a problem
with his spouse. 128 The police came to enforce a protective order
she had obtained against him.' 29 She was moving out, and she said
30
to the police, "Oh, by the way, he's got marijuana in the house."'
In an eight to one decision, Justice Breyer writing for the majority
held that given the nature of the police intrusion and the law
enforcement interest at stake, the brief seizure of the premises
while the police sought a warrant was not unreasonable.' 31 In
contrast with Atwater, the Court saw no reason to adopt a per se
rule.1 32 Instead, it balanced the privacy-related interest McArthur
had in his home and law enforcement concerns.' 33 Justice Breyer
pointed out that the police had probable cause and they had good
reason to fear that unless restrained, McArthur would destroy the
drugs before they could return with a warrant.' 34 He emphasized
that the police made reasonable efforts to reconcile their needs
with McArthur's privacy interests in that they neither searched the
135
premises nor arrested McArthur before obtaining a warrant.
Justice Breyer distinguished Welsh v. Wisconsin, 136 which held that
the police could not enter a home without a warrant to prevent the
loss of evidence as they were pursuing a drunk driver whose
offense was non-jailable. 137 In this case, Breyer reasoned, the
evidence was for a jailable offense and temporarily keeping a
I'Id. at 327.
128

Id. at 328. Tera McArthur, the defendant's wife, asked the police to

accompany her to their trailer, where they both lived, so the police could keep
the129peace
while she removed her belongings. Id.
Id.
130

Id. at 329. Tera stated to the police, "Chuck [the defendant] has dope in

there." Id.
131 McArthur, 531 U.S. at 331 ("The warrantless seizure was not per se
unreasonable. It involves a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law
enforcement
need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances.').
132
id.

133

Id.

134 Id. at 332.
135 id.
136 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
117 Id. at 753 (holding that the application of the exigent-circumstances

exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there

is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue
in this case, had been committed).
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person from entering his home is 38considerably less intrusive than a
police entry into the home itself:
In Arkansas v. Sullivan,139 decided per curiam, the Court
reminded us that its decision in Whren v. United States,140
upholding pretextual arrests, is alive and well and is to be
followed.' 4 ' In Sullivan, the Arkansas Supreme Court declined to
follow Whren on the grounds that much of Whren was dicta and
even if Whren precludes inquiry into an arresting officer's
subjective motivation, it was free to interpret the U.S. Constitution
more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court. 142 The Court told the
Arkansas Supreme Court that Whren means what it says, and that a
state high court has no power to afford greater protections under
the Federal Constitution than those acknowledged by the Supreme
Court.

143

What significance exists in Sullivan resides in Justice
Ginsburg's concurring opinion, which was joined by Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer. Justice Ginsburg observes that the
Arkansas courts had recognized that validating Sullivan's arrest
would give the police disturbing discretion. 44 She explained that
Atwater, taken in tandem with Whren, poses a great danger:
Atwater relied in part on a "dearth of horribles demanding
redress," but "if experience demonstrates 'anything like an
epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense arrests,' I hope the Court
will reconsider [Atwater]." 14s
As we speak, the issue is very relevant here in New York
because last week the New York Court of Appeals heard argument
in three pretext cases and the court will decide whether it will
follow Whren, or whether under Article I, § 12 of the New York

.3 McArthur, 531 U.S. at 336.
139 532 U.S. 769 (2001).
'40 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
'4' Sullivan, 532 U.S. at 772 ("A traffic-violation.. .arrest
will not be rendered
invalid by the fact that it was a mere pretext for a narcotics search.").
'42 Id. at 771.
"41 Id. at 772.
'44 id. at 772-73 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
'45 id. at 772 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (quoting Atwater,
352 U.S. at 353).
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Constitution 46 it will hold that our state constitution provides
greater protection than does the Fourth Amendment. 47 Prior to
my reading about the oral argument in those cases and talking to
my former colleagues at the Legal Aid Society who argued the
case, I was predicting that the New York Court of Appeals would
depart from Whren and give us additional protection. However,
from what I have learned, it seems that from the defendant's side
of the table, the oral argument in those cases was a disaster. I
could not detect from the reports or from those who had watched a
videotape of the arguments that the judges of the Court of Appeals
were sympathetic to the argument that the court should decline to
follow Whren even though some Court of Appeals' precedents and
decisions of the lower courts cast aspersion on the use of the arrest
out there and you should
power pretextually. So those cases are
148
keep your eyes open for their decision.
The final Fourth Amendment case is actually one in which
the Court granted certiorari, but then decided that because of the
procedural posture of the case, certiorari was improvidently
granted. 149 I mention it only because the issue that interested the
Court initially will surely arise again. The case was Florida v.
Thomas 150 and the Court had granted certiorari to resolve the
question of whether New York v. Belton' 5 1 is limited to situations
in which an arresting officer initiates contact with the occupant of
146

N.Y. CONST. Art. I, § 12 provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.. .. "
147 U.S. CONST. amend IV provides in pertinent part: "The right
of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated ......
148 Subsequent to Professor Hellerstein's speech, on December 18, 2001, the
New York Court of Appeals decided the case of People v. Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d
341 (2001), and held that the New York State Constitution is to be read as
coterminous with the United States Constitution on this issue. Id. at 346. The
Court stated "we adopt Whren v. United States as a matter of state law." Id.
(internal citations omitted).
149 Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774, 777-80 (2001) (stating that since there

was no final order or judgment of the case in the Florida courts, the Court lacked
jurisdiction).
50
1

id.

"'t 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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a vehicle while that person remains inside the vehicle. 52 In
Belton, the Court had held that the search incident to arrest
doctrine allows the police to search the passenger compartment of
a vehicle even though the arrestee has already been removed from
the vehicle.' 5 3 In Thomas, while the police were investigating
marijuana sales and making arrests at a Florida home, Thomas
drove up parked in the driveway and walked toward the back of
the car. T5 After a license check revealed an outstanding warrant,
1 55
Thomas was arrested, handcuffed, and taken inside the home.
The officer then went back outside, alone, and searched56 Thomas'
car, finding several bags containing methamphetamine.1
The Florida Supreme Court held that Belton did not
apply.' 57 The dismissal of certiorari thus leaves open the question
as to the precise scope of the search incident doctrine. In People v.
Belton, our Court of Appeals had held that the search incident
doctrine did not allow a search of the defendant's leather jacket
located in the car's passenger compartment when the arrest was for
a traffic offense.' 5 8 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that
the officer's protection allows for the search. 59 On remand to the
Court of Appeals, the court upheld the search but not under the
search incident doctrine. 6° Instead, it held that the officers had
probable cause to believe there was contraband in the car and
therefore the passenger compartment and the leather jacket could
be searched pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. 6 The Court of Appeals stated that it was reluctant to
follow the Supreme Court's analysis in Belton, because it felt that
the Supreme Court was expanding the search incident doctrine

152 Thomas, 532 U.S. at 776.

'"3 Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
114 Thomas, 532 U.S. at 776.
155 Id.
156 Id.

157 id.

'58 People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 452 (1980), rev'd by Belton, 453 U.S. at
454.
"9 Belton, 453 U.S. at 461.
160 People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 55 (1982) on remand from Belton, 453
U.S. at 454.
161 Id. at 55.
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beyond the grabbable area concept that had justified the doctrine
when the Supreme Court decided Chimel v. California162 in 1969.
So, that is the Court's work on the Fourth Amendment for
the Term. It was not only an interesting Fourth Amendment Term,
but also one in which the number of Fourth Amendment cases
decided rendered it a Term in which the Fourth Amendment was
rather dominant.

162

395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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